Description

One of the most persistent questions in the history of thinking out the sphere of political life pertains to the relation between the spectator and the actor in this sphere. The sphere of political life is a space in which human beings appear as together simply for the sake of being together. One implication of this definition is that in the sphere of political life there is an inherent value in being together in a way that holds open the possibility for being together into the future. That is, even this brief description of the sphere of political life already delimits the very activity of the political; nothing is to be discussed or carried out in this sphere that would threaten the possibility for the continual actualization of the political in the future. What this implication then demands is an outline of precisely what activity has this characteristic; what activity holds this space open primarily for the sake of its openness? One answer, favored in this thesis, would be to say that what allows people to be together in the sphere of political life simply for the sake of seeing one another and being seen in this sphere is universal and disinterested speech and action that is enacted by individuals amongst other distinct and unique individuals. In this definition of the sphere of political life the reader may already recognize echoes of the Kantian political, insofar as the sphere of political life is held open by universality and disinterestedness; as well as echoes of the Arendtian political, because it defines the sphere of political life in terms of appearing to others through speech and action. Immanuel Kant's political writings tend to locate the sphere of political life within the realm of the spectator, who views and judges a political event universally and disinterestedly.